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THE APPLICATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LAWS TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS:
THE IRRESISTIBLE FORCE MEETS
THE IMMOVEABLE OBJECT
Oliver S. Thomas'
Introduction
The application of anti-discrimination laws to churches and other religious
institutions pits a fundamental constitutional principle against what may be the most compelling
public policy interest in post World War II America. On one hand stands the First Amendment's
"wall of separation" between church and state as expressed in the constitutional doctrines of non-
establishment, free exercise and church autonomy; on the other is a national commitment to
eradicate discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and more recently age and
handicap.3  The clash between this constitutional principle and the commitment to equal
opportunity for all Americans has spawned some of the most difficult-and controversial-cases in
constitutional low.
Courts, as the final arbiters of the Constitution, must decide which of these
fundamental principles will prevail. Shall they sacrifice religious liberty in the name of civil rights,
or shall they preserve church autonomy to the detriment of individual rights? Is the answer to
be found in the language of the Constitution itself, or must courts look elsewhere in making their
decision?
1Oliver Thomas is counsel to the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs. This paper
was first presented to the ABA conference on "Religion in Public Life," University of
Pennsylvania, May 3 1, 199 1, and is reprinted here with permission.
2The term "church" is used generically in this paper to refer to churches, temples,
synagogues and other ecclesiastical bodies.
3It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the application of laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion to religious institutions. While the Supreme Court has
not held that religious organizations have a constitutional right to discriminate on the basis
of religion in hiring those individuals who perform purely "secular" as opposed to "religious"
functions, the Court, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987),
held unanimously that the following exemption, contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, does not violate the First Amendment's prohibition against laws "respecting an
establishment of religion":
This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a
religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its
activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-1.
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The author's goal is to construct a useful analytical framework for
predicting how future cases should and will be decided. It is not within the scope of this paper
to address state or municipal anti-discrimination laws. The constitutional and policy arguments set
forth in this paper, however, should apply with equal weight to state and local questions.
I. THE CONSmMUNONAL PRINCIPLE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution begins: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
. .. ." These sixteen words provide religious institutions with a formidable barrier to
governmental regulation.4 The protections provided by the religion clauses can be classified into
three distinct categories: those arising under (1) the establishment (louse, (2) the free exercise
clause and (3) the church autonomy cases.
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause governs the delicate relationship between the
institutions of government and religion. It provides what many have come to refer to as the
"separation of church and state." The controlling principle is one of governmental neutrality-both
between religions and between religion and irreligion. The value underlying the establishment
clause is, of course, the voluntary nature of religion. Authentic religion must be wholly uncoerced.
Influenced by John Locke's Letter of Toleration as well as the writings of
Baptist leader Roger Williams and other colonial dissenters, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
set out to enshrine these values in the law. In its 1947 decision of Everson v. Board of
Education,' the Supreme Court, relying heavily upon the writings of Madison and Jefferson, stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
4Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference With Religious
Organizations, 41 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 347 (1984); Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional
jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 99 (1989); Laycock, Towards
a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981).
S330 U.S. 1.
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any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between Church and
State."'
In Lemon v. Kurizman," the Court fashioned a three-porl test to assist it
in analyzing cases arising under the establishment clause. Despite strident criticism by less
separationisi members of the Court,8 the test has been utilized in all but one of its establishment
clause cases decided since 1971.
In order to pass muster under the Lemon test, a law (1) must have a
secular purpose, (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and
(3) must not foster excessive entanglement between government and religiont." While part two
of the test forbids laws that have a primary effect of inhibiting religion and, therefore, would
seem to protect religious oiganizations from burdensome governmental regulations, this portion
of the test has never been used to invalidate any such governmental action. This is due in part
to the fact that despite Lemon's reciprocal language of advancing "or inhibiting" religion, most
ild. at 15-i 6. Despite the strong separationist dicta in Everson, the Court upheld a state
program whereby parents were reimbursed for transportation costs incurred in sending their
children to parochial schools.
7403 U.S. 602 (1971).
BCouniy of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., __ U.S. 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3134
(1989) (Kernedy, J. dissenting); Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Wailace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) fRehrcuist, J., dissenting).
9See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (19831) (upholding the long-standing practice
of legislative chaplaincies on the rationale that the same Cungiess which passed the First
Amendment created the first legis'ative chaplaincy).
'0403 US. 672, 612-13
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lawyers and judges tend to view the establishment clause a  prohibiting governmental aid to
religion and the free exercise clause as prohibiting governmentally imposed burdens."
Lemon's third prong, on the other hand, would seem to provide some
assistance to religious entities seeking excusal from generally applicable statutes and regulations.
The prohibition against laws creating excessive governmental entanglement with religion arose in
the 1970 decision of Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York. 2 The plaintiff in Walz
challenged the long-standing municipal practice of granting property tax exemptions to religious
and charitable organizations. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that one of the
primary purposes of the establishment clause was to prevent government entanglement with
religion. According to Burger, taxing religious institutions would lead to a greater likelihood of
impermissible entanglement than would exempting them.' 3 Because the exemptions at issue in
Walz were not provided exclusively to religious organizations, and because they amounted to
nothing more than a refusal on the part of government to tax religious and charitable
organizations, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the establishment clause.
While the Supreme Court to date has not used the prohibition against
excessive entanglement to strike down the application of generally applicable government
regulations to churches,' 4 the dicta in Woiz hints at this possibility.'" Moreover, the Court has
been extremely zealous in its enforcement of the non-entanglement principle in the context of
government aid to parochial schools, striking down even those programs with the mere potential
for excessive entanglement. 6 1t would seem, therefore, and at least one commentator has
argued, that the non-entanglement principle should provide some protection against the application
of anti.discrimination laws to churches.'I However, the courts' reluctance to interpret the
establishment clause as a shield against governmentally imposed burdens on religion means that
churches should look elsewhere for their primary constitutional defense. A far more likely source
of protection was, until recently, found in the free exercise clause.
IIE.g., Laycock, supro note 4.
12397 U.S. 664.
'
31d at 674.
'
4The Court has refused, for example, to exempt churches from the minimum wage and
record-keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Tony and Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1987).
Is'T]he questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing
one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of
entanglement." Wolz, 397 U.S. at 675.
16Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S 402 (1985).
1Esbeck, supra note 4.
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B. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause prohibits, insofar as possible, government
interference with religious belief and conduct. While the freedom to believe is absolute, the
freedom to act is not."8 Religiously motivated conduct, therefore, is subject to some degree of
government regulation. For example, a religious group may believe in human sacrifice, but the
state is free to outlaw the practice in order to protect the safety and welfare of its citizens."
On the other hand, the Court has recognized that the freedom to believe is a shallow freedom,
indeed, if one may not act upon one's beliefs.' For that reason, the Court has traditionally
subjected laws that burden religious conduct to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny.2'
The fountainhead for modem free exercise analysis is Sherbert v. Verner,
decided in 1963.22 Ms. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was discharged
from her employment because she refused, for religious reasons, to work on Saturdays. When
she applied for unemployment compensation benefits, the State of South Carolina denied her
claim, holding that she "failed, without good cause . . . to accept suitable work."2 Ms. Sherbert
sought judicial review of the state's decision on the ground that it violated her constitutional right
to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that a state may not force
an individual to make the "cruel choice" between violating her sincere religious beliefs on the one
hand or forfeiting her government benefits on the other.24 In sustaining Ms. Sherbert's claim,
the Court fashioned a separate test to assist it in analyzing free exercise claims.
Under the Sherbert test, as it has been refined in subsequent cases, 2S
a prima-facie case is established if the claimant can show that (1) his conduct is motivated by
a sincere religious belief, and (2) the government has directly or indirectly burdened this
IaContwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-4 (1940).
19Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 166 (1878).
20Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972).
2
1West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). See also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (stating that religious liberty is a "preferred" freedom).
22374 U.S. 398.
23Id. at 401.
241d. at 404.
2
5See Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, __ U.S. __ , 109
S.Ct. 1514 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yader, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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conduct."h The burden of persuasion then shifts to the state to show that (1) its action is
justified by a compelling state interest, and (2) no less restrictive or less burdensome means of
accomplishing its interest exiss.2' The magnitude of the state interest necessary to justify a
burden on the free exercise of religion has been described as being "of the highest order"28 and
involving "some substantial threat to public safety, peace, and order."" "Only the gravest
concerns, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. "30
While the Court has crafted a test that would appear to give free exercise
claims an extraordinarily high degree of constitutional protection, claimants, in fact, have fared
rather poorly. The Court has refused to apply Sherbert in a number of cases and instead has
substituted a lower standard of scrutiny requiring a mere rational basis for acts burdening the free
exercise of religion." Even in those cases where Sherbert has been held to apply, the test has
yielded results that belie its libertarian language.3" Native Americans in particular have received
little relief from the Court." This has left some lawyers and judges wondering if Sherbert has
real significance outside the unemployment compensation area.
Civil libertarians' worst fears came to pass on April 17, 1990, with the
landmark free exercise decision Employment Division v. Smith.5 The Court in Smith made clear
that the Sherbert test was no longer applicable to claims raised against facially neutral, generally
26Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
211d. at 406-07.
28Thomas, 450 U.S at 718.
29Sherbert, 374 U S. 398, 406 (1963).
30 Id
31t0Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (involving prisoners); Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (involving military personnel).
32See, e.g., U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
33Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association ,.. U.S. --- , 108
S.Ct. 1319 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
34E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Townley Engineering and
Manufacturing Company, 85 F.2d 610, 622 (1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
35494 U.S. 
___ 10 S.Ct. 1595
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applicable laws.' Despite strident criticism by commentators1 and universal condemnation by
religious and civil liberties groups,' Smith leaves little protection for churches from generally
applicable anti-discrimination laws.
C. The Church Autonomy Cases
A third source of constitutional protection for religious institutions arises
from a line of Supreme Court decisions involving church doctrine, governance, policy and
administration. Beginning in 1871, the Court has held that such ecclesiastical questions lie beyond
the jurisdiction of civil authorities.39 Commentators differ over whether these decisions should
be considered as arising under the free exercise or establishment clauses,' but the cases
themselves tend to be couched in general language usually referring simply to the First
Amendment or to the religion clauses. The author will not attempt to pigeonhole the church
autonomy cases under either clause but will discuss them on their own merits.
In Watson v. Jones,4 the Court addressed the first in a series of cases
involving property disputes between proslavery and antislavery forces within the churches. The
Presbyterian denomination, like many others, had split over the slavery issue, and the proslavery
forces at the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, were trying to seize control
of the church property in violation of the orders of the General Assembly, the denomination's
highest judicatory body. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held for the proslavery majority, but the
Supreme Court reversed. In a decision one church leader has described as the "manifesto" of
361d. at
37E.g., Laycock, The Remnant of Free Exercise, 1990 S.Ct. Rev. Laycock, The
Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise and the Amicus Brief That Never Was Filed, 8 J. L.
and Relig. 71 (1990); McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
Chi. 1. Rev. 1109 (1990); Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountain Top, 79 Calif. L Rev.
__ (1991).
38See e.g., New York Times, May 11, 1991, at A16.
39Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 ( 1952); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). It should be noted that courts may hear a church
property dispute if the case can be decided on "neutral principles" of law and without
examining church doctrine. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). This limited exception
should not apply to cases involving discrimination by religious institutions which inevitably
involve questions of doctrine.
40Compare Laycock, supra note 4 with Esbeck, supra note 4.
4t8 0 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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church autonomy rights," the Court held that the ecclesiastical decisions of the highest ranking
judicatory of a particular denomination must be accepted by civil courts:
The right to organize voluntary religious
associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted
questions of faith within the association, and for
the ecclesiastical government of all the individual
members, congregations and officers within the
general association, is unquestioned. All who
unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are
bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain
consent and would lead to the total subverision
of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular
courts and have them reversed. It is of the
essence of these religious unions, and of their
right to establish tribunals for the decision of
questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of
ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such
appeals as the organism itself provides for. 3
Decided prior to the application of the religion clauses to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment,' Watson is based upon federal common law. Notwithstanding, it
is the first decision recognizing the autonomy of religious institutions and continues to be cited
by the Court."
42D. Kelley, The Proper Relations of Government and Religion 391 (ABA conference on
"Tort and Religion," 1988).
43Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1872).
44See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the free exercise
clause); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the establishment
clause).
45E.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952).
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The Court revisited church property disputes in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 6 this time grounding its opinion solidly in the First Amendment. The facts of the case
underscore the strength of the autonomy principle.
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had altered radically the status of
churches in Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church went from a position of power and privilege
in Russian society to one of weakness and subordination. The Patriarch was imprisoned, and the
church's administration was brought under the control of a state that was openly hostile toward
religion. Predictably, the upheaval of the Russian church caused serious repercussions in the North
American diocese. A widespread movement for independence from the mother church was
launched, and the New York legislature responded by passing a statute which undertook to
transfer control of the Russian Orthodox churches in New York from the church's hierarchy in
Moscow to the governing bodies of the "Russian Church in America." The statute was challenged
by the mother church and upheld by the Supreme Court of New York. The United States
Supreme Court, citing Watson v. Jones, reversed, holding that in cases involving ecclesiastical
questions civil courts must defer to the decisions of the highest ranking judicatory body of the
church.4  Because the appointment of clergy and control of church assets are ecclesiastical
questions, said the Court, the New York statute is barred by the First Amendment.48
The Court's decision is significant not only because of its unusual facts,
but also because of its date. As Professor Gedicks has stated:
Kedroff is startling because it was handed down,
not in an era of glasnost or even detente, but in
1952, in the midst of post-war American fear of
Soviet world domination and communist
conspiracies. The Court's holding left religious
property that was located in the United States
and that served the spiritual needs of its citizens,
under the effective control of the Soviet Union at
the very time that Joseph McCarthy was
traversing the country ruining reputations and
careers with the mere accusation of Soviet
complicity.
49
46344 U.S. 94 (1952).
47ld. at 110-121.
48
1d.
49Gedicks, supra note 4, at 133.
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Moving beyond church property disputes, the Court in Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manilo50 broadened the autonomy principle to include church employment.
At issue in the case was the refusal of the Archbishop of Manila to appoint the plaintiff to the
chaplaincy. Said the Court:
Because the appointment [of a chaplain] is a
canonical act, it is the function of the church
authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the
candidate possesses them. In the absence of
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made
them so by contract or otherwise."'
The Court further closed the door on civil adjudication of church
employment disputes when it refused to recognize the exception for arbitrary and capricious
employment decisions that had been suggested by the Court in Gonzalez. The case, Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,'2 makes clear that even the most egregious church
employment disputes lie beyond the jurisdiction of civil authorities.
A recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals provides insight
into how lower courts are applying the church autonomy doctrine. In Crowder v. Southern Baptist
Convention, 3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated how far courts may be willing
to go in order to avoid involvement in ecclesiastical questions. At the annual meeting of the
Southern Baptist Convention in 1985, convention moderates, dissatisfied with the nominations of
the fundamentalist-(ontrolled Committee on Boards, Commissions and Standing Committees, sought
to offer a substitute slate of nominees for consideration by the "messengers" (i.e., delegates).
The president of the convention, himself a fundamentalist, ruled the effort to nominate an
alternate slate of candidates out of order despite convention bylaws giving to the messengers "the
right to consider and amend the body of all reports." 4 Although the president's ruling was
appealed and overruled, he remained adamant in his refusal to allow the alternate list of names
so280 U.S. 1 (1929).
51
Id. at 16.
52426 U.S. 696 (1976).
53828 F.2d 718 (11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1028 (1988).
S4Id. at 720
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to be placed in nomination. Moreover, he repeatedly failed to recognize those messengers who
sought to raise points of order."5 The candidates nominated by the Committee on Boards,
Commissions and Standing Committees subsequently were elected.
Enraged over what they perceived as the president's unwillingness to abide
by convention rules, several moderates sued the convention, asking that the election be rescinded.
They cited in support of their position Jones v. Wolf, which holds that courts may resolve church
property disputes if it can be done through the application of "neutral principles" of law." The
plaintiffs argued that their case, like Jones, involved a simple interpretation of non-doctrinal
convention bylaws as well as Roberts Rules of Order.
Despite a series of state court decisions requiring churches to follow their
own procedural rules,57 the Eleventh Circuit refused to enter the Southern Baptist fray. Restricting
Jones solely to church property disputes, the court stated:
This controversy is one step removed from a
major doctrinal conflict between two factions
within the Southern Baptist Convention. Although
a civil court might be able to avoid questions of
religious beliefs or doctrines in ruling on the
issue of whether the Southern Baptist Committee
on Boards elected at the 1985 Convention was
entitled to serve in this capacity, "questions of
church discipline and the composition of the
church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical
concern." (citation omitted) 8
Crowder is ample testimony to the continued viability of the church autonomy principle.
SSId
"
S6443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
S7Eg., In re Baptist Church, 186 So.2d 102 (Ala. 1966); Randolph v. First Baptist
Church, 53 Ohio App. 2d 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954); Taylor v. Jackson, 273 F. 345
(D.C. 1921).
s8828 F.2d 718, 726.
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges
II. THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AS A COMPEWNG
STATE INTEREST
Beginning with the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education s' the
concept of equal opportunity for all Americans without regard to race has emerged as a
fundamental national policy. Decisions such as Baker v. Car/o and Runyon v. McCra]' I would
lead one to conclude that the eradication of racial discrimination is perhaps the most compelling
state interest in the constellation of American public policy."2
Over the past quarter of a century, every
pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of
Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm
national policy to prohibit racial segregation and
discrimination in public education."T
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court made clear how far
it is willing to go to enforce this policy. Despite the absence of clear statutory authority,6 the
Court upheld the Internal Revenue Service 's position that an organization exempt from taxation
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) must act in accordance with the established public policy of nondiscrimina-
tion.'t The Court dismissed the constitutional arguments made on Bob Jones University's behalf
asserting: "The government interest at stake here is compelling.""
Those concerned about the use of Bob Jones to uphold the application of
anti-cdiscrimination laws to churches can take some consolation in the fact that: (1) the Court
expressly limited its holding to schools, stating: "We deal here only with religious schools-not
with churches or other purely religious institutions,"'" and (2) the withdrawal of an organization's
59347 U.S. 483.
60369 U.S. 186 (1962) (upholding the right of Black voters to challenge a state
reapportionment scheme under the equal protection clause).
61427 U.S. 160 (1976) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as applyir9 to private schsou,
under the Thirteenth Amendment's "badge of slavery" rationale).
6
2See Gedicks, supro note 4, at 13 1.
63Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S 574, 593 (1983)
641d. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6
5Id. at 595.
66Id. at 604.
67Id. at 604 n.29 It should be noted, however, that the Internal Revenue Service has
sought to apply the decision in Bob Jones to a local church. Second Baptist Church of
Goldsboro v Commissioner, T C. Doc. No "". -- .- siettled July 11, 1989).
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tax-exempt status does not constitute as severe a burden on the free exercise of religion as
ordering it to employ particular persons.
While the Court has been unwilling to treat sex as a suspect classification
for purposes of the equal protection (lause," laws prohibiting sex discrimination have been
upheld in the face of First Amendment challenges based upon freedom of association. In Roberts
v. United States Jaycees," the Court upheld the Minnesota Department of Human Rights exercise
of jurisdiction over the all-male Jaycees and reached a similar decision in a case involving the
Rotary Club.70
More than likely the Court would treat laws prohibiting other forms of
discrimination (e.g., national origin, sexual orientation) similarly. In each instance the court is
likely to consider the state's underlying interest "compelling." This is particularly troubling for
religious organizations whose religious doctrines may prohibit the employment of some individuals
such as homosexuals.
11. THE CONFUCT
Difficulty arises when the state's efforts to eliminate discrimination conflict
with the constitutional principles of free exercise, non-establishment and church autonomy. These
cases force courts to choose between the relative importance of mediating structures"' and the
separation of church and state on the one hand and individual rights to participate fully in every
aspect of society on the other.
The Supreme Court has been particularly reluctant to make this choice and
has employed a number of legal doctrines to avoid reaching the underlying constitutional issues.
Several lower courts, however, have addressed the fundamental policy choices presented by this
conflict.
68Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
69468 U.S. 609 (1984).
708oard of Directors of Rotan International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987). See also New York State Club Association v. City of New York, __ U.S. __,
108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988).
t t See Gedicks, supra note 4 for the importance generally of mediating structures.
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A. Deferrinq to Slate Authorities
In 1986, the Court was presented with an opportunity to decide the extent
to which a parochial school is subject to a state's anti-discrimination laws." Linda Hoskinson had
filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission charging the Dayton Christian Schools, a
fundamentalist primary and secondary school, with sex discrimination contrary to Ohio law."
The school had terminated Hoskinson's teaching contract after she had her first child on the basis
of the school's religious belief that mothers with small children should not be employed outside
the home. The state initiated an inquiry into the school's employment policies but was stymied
when the school filed an action in federal court seeking to enjoin the investigation. While the
district court held for the commission," the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over the school was barred by the First Amendment. 7s
In a unanimous opinion authored by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
reversed but, at the same time, refused to decide whether Ms. Hoskinson could be ordered
reinstated." Invoking the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris," the Court held
that the district court erred in hearing the case insofar as Dayton Christian Schools would have
ample opportunity to assert its constitutional defenses in the state proceedings which already had
been initiated by the Commission. 7' Although the Court held that the mere exercise of
jurisdiction over and investigation of a parochial school does not violate the First Amendment, 9
it expressly reserved the school's right "to level constitutional challenges against the potential
sanctions for the alleged sex discrimination."8'
72Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
73Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 (Supp. 1985).
74578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
'5766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
76477U.S. 619 11986).
77401 U.S. 37 (1971).
78Id. at 625, 628.
791bid.
80lbid. at 629. The case was settled prior to an adjudication by the state court of the
school's constitutional claims. A decision similar to that of the Supreme Court in Dayton
Christian Schools was reached by the Second Court of Appeals in Christ the King Regional
High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (1987).
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B. Construing Statutes to Avoid the Conflict
Although the abstention doctrine has been invoked so as to avoid deciding
the extent to which the First Amendment shields religious institutions from anti-discrimination
claims, the Court has given some indication of how it might interpret legislation in this sensitive
area. In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,8 the Court was asked
to decide whether lay teachers in parochial schools82 are subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board and, if so, whether this would violate the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. After examining the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the
National Labor Relations Actu the Court concluded that despite its sweeping definition of
"employer," the Ad did not confer jurisdiction over parochial schools. In the words of the Court:
[I]n the absence of a dear expression of
Congress' intent to bring teachers in church-
operated schools within the jurisdiction of the
board, we decline to construe the Act in a
manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising
out of the guarantees of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses.' 4
The decision evoked a scathing dissent by Justice Brennan who, joined by Justices White, Marshall
and Blackmun, accused the Court of interpreting the Act in a manner that ignored the intent of
Congress.85
Despite the Court's sharp division in Catholic Bishop, the general principle
of construing a statute so as to avoid deciding constitutional questions is well settled in the law.B"
It is the additional requirement of a "clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress"
that troubled Justice Brennan and his colleagues.' 7 Brennan's objections notwithstanding, the
8t440 U.S. 490 (1979).
82The term "parochial school" is used generically to describe any primary or secondary
school owned and operated by a church or other religious organization.
8329 U.S.C § 151 et seq. (1973).
84Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507.
8tld. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86Eg., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cronch 65 (1804).
OlCotholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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application of Catholic Bishop to anti-discriminafion laws that do not express a clear legislative
intent to regulate pervasively sectarian institutions" would appear an attractive alternative to
courts.89 At least one federal appeals court has been willing to invoke Catholic Bishop to proted
even religiously affiliated colleges and universities from employment regulation,90 but a for more
likely result is that Catholic Bishop will be interpreted to shield only those institutions that are
pervasively sectarian. This appears to be the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College.9 The district court in Rilter, like the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Universidad Central De Bayamon v. NLRB, held that the Equal Pay Act and
Age Discrimination in Employment Ad did not apply to a religiously affiliated institution of higher
learning. 2 In reversing, the Court of Appeals stated that the threshold inquiry under Catholic
Bishop is whether the application of a statute to a religious institution "presents 'a significant risk
that the First Amendment will be infringed . . . .'"" Because Mount St. Mary's College was not
pervasively sectarian and enforcement of the Equal Pay and Age Discrimination in Employment
Arts would not involve the college's "religious tenets and practices," the court found Catholic
Bishop inapplicable. "[W]e simply hold that comparisons of lay teachers with other lay teachers
at a religiously affiliated institution of higher learning under the provisions of the EPA and ADEA
fail to raise the kind of 'serious First Amendment questions' envisioned by the Supreme Court in
Catholic Bishop."' 4
Conversely, a recent decision by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri holds that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply
to a Roman Catholic seminary. Finding the seminary to be pervasively sectarian, the court
88The Supreme Court repeatedly has distinguished between institutions that are
pervasively sectarian and those that are merely affiliated with a religious organization. E.g.,
Bowen v. Kendrick, ___ U.S. __ , 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988). The term "pervasively
sectarian" is used to refer to houses of worship, parochial schools and other institutions in
which religion so permeates the institution that it is impossible to separate the entity's secular
activities from its religious activities. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755
(1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
89Included in this category of laws would seem to be the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d),
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et se 1
.90Universidad Central De Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383 (1" Cir. 1985).
91No. 81-1534, slip op. (4'" Cir. June 8, 1984).
92Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (1980).
93Ritter, No. 81-1534, slip op at 5 (4'" Cir. June 8, 1984) (quoting Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S at 502).
941d. A similar result was reached in Soriano v. Karuer University Corporation, 687
F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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concluded that application of the ADEA would give rise to "serious constitutional questions" and
was, therefore, barred by Catholic Bishop.9"
Resolving the Problem When Legislative Intent is Clear
Far more difficult to resolve are those cases involving anti-discrimination
laws that do express a clear legislative intent to regulate religious institutions. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides explicit exemptions for religious institutions from
those provisions of the Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion." 6 Moreover efforts
to exempt religious institutions from the Ad in its entirety were defeated by Congress."1 Thus,
there is no doubt that Congress intended the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex and national origin" to apply to religious institutions. Similarly, Title I of the
95Cochran v. St. Louis Prepatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413, 1446 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
Distinguishing between "religiously affiliated" and "pervasively
sectarian" institutions for purposes of applying Catholic Bishop also is consistent with a long
line of Supreme Court decisions involving aid to parochial schools. See supra note 88.
With few exceptions, [See, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding a state program providing reimbursement to parochial
schools for cost of administering state required tests). The Court also has upheld a variety
of programs for students who attend parochial schools under the so-called "child benefit
theory." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (diagnostic services); Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (bus transportation)] the Court has disqualified parochial schools from eligibility for
virtually all state and federal aid programs designed to assist primary and secondary schools,
e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
on the theory that religion so permeates these institutions that it is impossible to isolate and
fund their secular activities, see supra note 88. Having disqualified pervasively sectarian
institutions from receiving government funding, it is reasonable to assume that courts will
refrain from regulating these institutions unless forced to do so by unambiguous legislative
intent. Thus, it appears that Catholic Bishop will remain a considerable barrier to the
application of particular civil rights laws (i.e., those not indicating a clear intent to regulate
religious institutions) to pervasively sectarian institutions. While courts might be expected to
refrain from applying the Equal Pay Act or Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
pervasively sectarian institutions, the Ninth Circuit held otherwise in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
Assuming arguendo that other circuits follow suit, the extent of coverage (i.e., degree of
regulation) would be similar to that of Title VIl's prohibitions against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex or national origin. See infra text accompanying notes 96-136.
9642 U S.C. § 2000e-1.
9t See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d
1366 (9'" Cir. 1986).
9842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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Americans With Disabilities Act" is certain to apply to pervasively sectarian institutions. By
providing religious organizations with a limited exemption from litle I, ° the bill makes clear
that Congress intended for religious organizations to be subject to the general prohibitions on
discriminating against the handicapped in employment.'
Obviously, state and federal anti-disuiminaion laws are applicable to
religious institutions only to the extent they do not conflict with the First Amendment." The
difficulty, of course, lies in determining the precise amount of protection conferred upon religious
organizations by the First Amendment. Stated differently, what portion of a religious
organization's employment practices are wholly immune from governmental regulation?"
The author suggests that to resolve the question of how much protection
from employment regulation the First Amendment gives religious organizations, two important
factors must be considered: (1) the nature of the institution, and (2) the nature of the specific
position and/or activity." The use of these factors will result in four rather distinct categories
of cases: those involving (1) ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian institutions,
(2) ministerial functions in religiously affiliated institutions, (3) non-ministerial functions in
religiously affiliated institutions, and (4) non-ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian
institutions.
9942 U.S.C § 12101 etseq.
too42 U.S.C. § 12113(c) provides (1) In General-This title shall not prohibit a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society from giving preference in
employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities;
and (2) Qualification Standard-A religious organization may require, as a qualification
standard to employment, that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets
of such organization Id. at 10703.
totThe inclusion of persons having contagious diseases (e.g., AIDS) under the term
"handicap" insures that some religious groups will contest the application of this statute to
their organizations. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
102See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1801).
103A variety of approaches to answering this question has been suggested. E.g., Bagni,
Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious
Organizations, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1514, 1539 (1979); Laycock, supro note 4, at 1403.
t04 The United States Court of Appeals suggests a similar approach in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5"
Cir. 1981).
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1. Ministerial Functions in Pervasively Sectarian Institutions
On one end of the spectrum are those cases involving the employment
of ministers by a church or other pervasively sectarian institution. No doubt such cases lie beyond
the jurisdiction of civil authorities.t" s The Supreme Court's opinion in Serbian Eastern Orthodox
v. Milivojevich' °' demonstrates the strength of this principle, and there appear to be no
compelling policy arguments that would dictate a contrary result. Simply put, courts are unwilling
to inject themselves into labor disputes between a church and those who minister in its name.
In the words of one federal appeals court, "The relationship between an organized church and
its ministers is its lifeblood.""0  More recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated,
"The right to choose ministers without government restriction underlies the well-being of a religious
community, for perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to
preach its values, teach its message and interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and
to the world at large (citations omitted). "tc" Of particular interest are recent lower court
decisions interpreting the constitutionally based exemption for ministers broadly so as to include
church organists'0" and others involved in the ecclesiastical or liturgical functions of the church.
2. Ministerial Functions in Religiously Affiliated Institutions
Similar to the cases involving the employment of ministers by churches
are those involving the employment of persons performing ministerial functions for institutions that
are not pervasively sectarian. Despite the fact that these institutions are engaged primarily in
providing "non-sectarian" services,"0 such as health care or higher education, courts generally
105See supro text accompanying notes 39-58.
t06426 U.S- 696 (1976).
107McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5' Cir- 1972) (holding that an
officer in the Salvation Army was not protected by Title VII despite the fact that most of her
duties were clerical).
108Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68
(4h Cir. 1985). Accord Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6'" Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
109Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. App. 1989), Walker
v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Francisco, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 762 (Cal.
Super. 1980).
110It should be noted that even these non-religious, secular services are religiously
motivated.
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are unwilling to regulate the employment of a minister to perform essentially religious
functions." Hospital chaplains"' and theology teachers at religiously affiliated colleges and
universities 1 3 are among those whose positions lie beyond the reach of anti-discrimination laws.
Again, exclusion of these positions is consistent with principles of church autonomy and appears
unlikely to change. The policy arguments that might compel a different result are rejected for
the some reasons as with pervasively sectarian institutions. Although religiously affiliated
institutions perform numerous secular services, to the degree they wish to advance their religious
mission they should be permitted to do so. In short, if a Catholic hospital wishes to employ a
Catholic chaplain to minister in its name, any claims alleging discrimination-on the basis of race,
gender, sexual orientation or otherwise-in the selection of that chaplain should be barred by the
First Amendment.
3. Non-Ministerial Functions in Religiously Affiliated Institutions
On the other end of the spectrum are those cases involving the
employment of non-ministerial staff by institutions that are not pervasively sectarian but merely
affiliated with religious organizations. As noted, the most prolific examples are church hospitals,
colleges and universities. The vast majority of courts has been unwilling to recognize a First
Amendment defense to discrimination claims filed against this type of institution." 4 If, however,
the alleged discriminatory action is in fact based upon religious doctrine, courts may be compelled
to decline jurisdiction." s
Many reasons can be given as to why the free exercise clause should not
be interpreted to exempt all religiously affiliated institutions from generally applicable anti-
IIIObviously, if the minister were hired to coach, to tend the grounds or to perform other
services unrelated to the institution's religious mission, he would be protected by most anti-
discrimination laws including Title VII If, however, his employer were pervasively sectarian,
a different result might be reached. See infro text accompanying notes 1 18-136.
1
2 O'Connor Hospital v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 546, 240 Cal. Rptr. 766
(1987), Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospital, 929 F.2d 360 (8" Cir. 1991 ).
"
3Maguire v. Marquette University, 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1986), modified,
814 F.2d 1213 (7'- Cir. 1987), Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351
(1986).
114E.g, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing
Association, 676 F-2d 1272 (9" Cir. 1982) (editorial secretary at church-affiliated publishing
house), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 15"
Cir 1980) (psychology teacher at Baptist college); Russell v. Belmont College, 554
F. Supp. 667 (ND. Tenn. 1982) (education professor at Baptist college). But see Madsen
v Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
1t5Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 485, see also Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987).
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discrimination laws: such institutions provide essentially secular services; they are not so
permeated with religion that religious and non-religious activities cannot be separated; they are
eligible for and generally receive federal financial assistance either directly or indirectly; unlike the
church, they are not engaged primarily in worship and core religious functions; unlike elementary
and secondary religious schools, the primary goal of church colleges and universities is education,
not indoctrination; they are open to the general public and are widely attended and supported
by persons not affiliated with the sponsoring church and their services generally are offered at
market prices and are not provided gratuitously as in the case of most church ministries." 6
Given the nature of such institutions, any burden imposed upon their religious exercise would
appear minimal in light of the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination on the basis
of race, color, sex and national origin." For this reason, courts are unlikely to strike down
legislative efforts to regulate the employment relationship between these institutions and their non-
ministerial employees.
4. Non-Ministerial Functions in Pervasively Sectarian Institutions
The most difficult cases involve non-ministerial employees of pervasively
sectarian institutions. Is, for example, the church secretary protected by Title VII, or does the First
Amendment shield the church from all claims of discrimination? Few courts have addressed this
complex issue.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fremont Christian
Schoof" and Dolter v. Wahlert High School,"' the courts sustained sex discrimination claims
filed by faculty against parochial schools." ° In each case, the school's First Amendment defense
was rejected. Similarly, the court in Whitney v. Greater New York Corporation of Seventh-Day
116The author concedes that a particular religiously affiliated college or university might
not fit this general profile and in fact might be pervasively sectarian and, therefore, entitled
to the additional protections described in the text accompanying notes 136-155. See, e.g.,
Habel v- Industrial Dev. Authority, __ S.E-2d __ (Va. 19911.
'11Again, even institutions that are merely religiously affiliated, as opposed to pervasively
sectarian, continue to enjoy the right to discriminate on the basis of religious doctrine. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 and 200 0e-2(e).
IIS781 F.2d 1362 (9+ Cir. 1986).
119483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
120Even more disturbing than the decisions sustaining employment discrimination claims
against parochial schools is a 1978 decision forcing a church school to admit Blacks. The
decision, Brown v. Dade Christian School, 556 F.2d 310 (5'h Cir. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), avoided addressing the constitutional issue by finding
that the school's racial policy was not religiously motivated. The court's finding ignores the
principal's testimony to the contrary. Id. at 31 2
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Adventists2' upheld the sex discrimination claim of a typist-receptionist despite the church's
constitutional protestations.
Presumably, the church's defense would have been stronger in each of
these cases if its alleged discriminatory actions were compelled by its religious doctrines. Few
churches, however, could make such a claim, as doctrinal discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex or national origin is usually confined to the employment of ministers. Indeed, the
author knows of no religious organization whose formal doctrines would compel it to pay Black
or female support staff less than their white male counterparts. On the other hand, laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would be likely to conflict with the
doctrines of many churches, even at the support staff level. For example, the Southern Baptist
Convention, the nation's largest Protestant denomination, recently passed a resolution indicating
the staunch doctrinally-based opposition of many evangelical churches to homosexuality.'
Obviously, forcing such a church to employ homosexuals would constitute a substantial burden on
its free exercise of religion.
That religious institutions are more likely to prevail when their alleged
discriminatory action is based upon religious doctrine is demonstrated by a recent decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. The court, in Madsen v. Erwin," held that a church newspaper
employee's claim for alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was barred by the
First Amendment. Said the court: "[I]f Madsen 'were allowed to collect damages from
defendants because [she] was discharged for being gay, defendants would be penalized for their
religious belief that homosexuality is a sin for which one must repent . . . .' Requiring the
defendants to pay damages to maintain their religious beliefs would constitute 'a substantial
burden on defendant's right to free exercise of religion."' (citations omitted)' 24
The single most important case addressing the application of anti-
discrimination laws to non-ministerial staff in pervasively sectarian institutions would appear to be
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.' 25 In
Southwestern Seminary, the Court of Appeals found that Title VIl's jurisdiction extended even to
the employment practices of a theological seminary. Characterizing the seminary as wholly
121401 F. Supp 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
127Resolution No. 6-On Homosexuality, Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention, 71
(1988).
123481 N E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985)
1241d. at 1166.
12 651 F.2d 277 (5' Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
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sectarian and the legal equivalent of a church, 26 the court nonetheless held that application of
Title VII's reporting requirements to the seminary's "support" (i.e., non-ministerial) staff did not
violate the First Amendment.' 27 This was true despite the fact that at least four of the support
staff were ordained." The court, citing Mcdlure v. Salvation Army,"2 acknowledged, however,
that support staff might well lie beyond the scope of Title VII if they performed ministerial
functions." ° This would include "swearing in officers [i.e., ordaining other ministers], conducting
weddings and funerals, and dedicating babies.''. Presumably, it would also include preaching,
teaching, baptizing, serving communion and performing other tasks the court considered
ecclesiastical or religious. One commentator has stated: "As a general rule, if the employee's
primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she would be
considered 'clergy.""
Obviously, such line drawing between religious and non-religious functions
involves significant governmental entanglement with religion and, therefore, is highly suspect under
the First Amendment." In the words of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: "There is the
danger that churches, wary of EEOC or judicial review of their decisions, might make them with
an eye to avoiding litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their own
personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve . . . their members..'... Moreover,
the Supreme Court itself has stated that "both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."' 
35
126"Since th  Seminary is principally supported and wholly controlled by the Convention
for the avowed purpose of training ministers to serve the Baptist denomination, it too is
entitled to the status of 'church." Id. at 283.
1211d. at 286-87. The court did hold that an exemption from Title VII for faculty and
administrative staff was constitutionally required.
1281d. at 284-
129460 F.2d 553 (5" Cir. 1972).
130Southwestern Seminary, 651 F.2d at 284.
131Id.
132Bagni, supro note 103, at 1545.
133See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
134Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 11 71
(4' v Cir. 1985).
135 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 2 12 (1948).
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Such considerations have led Professors Esbeck, Gedicks and Laycock to
recommend that the First Amendment be interpreted so as to exempt entirely churches and other
pervasively sectarian institutions from anti-discrimination laws." While the author agrees with
these recommendations, the fact that numerous lower courts have interpreted the First Amendment
more narrowly than these professors demands that close attention be paid to the policy
considerations implicated by these decisions.
IV. POUCY CONSIDERATIONS
As noted, courts are virtually unanimous in their decision to refrain from
regulating the employment relationship between ministers and religious institutions.'37  The
constitutionally based right of a religious organization to exercise control over the selection of
those who will minister in its behalf is deemed superior to the rights of aspiring ministers to be
free from invidious discrimination. While many may wince at a church's decision not to ordain
female ministers, principles of church-state separation demand that churches be permitted to make
this decision free from state interference. To hold otherwise would arrogate to the state the
power to determine doctrinal issues at the very core of a church's religious identity.
Conversely, courts are nearly unanimous in their decision to exercise some
degree of regulation over the relationship between religiously affiliated institutions and their
employees. If, for example, Congress passes a statute prohibiting discrimination against the
handicapped, courts are unlikely to find that the First Amendment compels an exemption for a
Baptist college that discriminates in the hiring of its law faculty." The policy arguments for
applying anti-discrimination laws to these employment relationships are, in the view of most
judges, compelling.' 39
In sharp contrast to the unanimity of opinion concerning the above-
mentioned categories are those cases involving the relationship between pervasively sectarian
institutions and their non-ministerial employees. In this unsettled area of the law,t" policy
arguments are likely to be critical. As noted, the operative legal principles in these cases are
sufficiently flexible that courts can easily justify a decision on either side. At bottom, the court
136 Esbeck, supra note 4; Gedicks, supro note 4; Laycock, supra note 4.
137The term "religious institutions" includes both pervasively sectarian and religiously
affiliated institutions,
138A different result would be reached with regard to the religion faculty. Most likely
a theology teacher at a Baptist college would be treated as a "minister" for the purposes of
the First Amendment. See supra note 1 13.
139See text accompanying note 1 14, supro.
140See text accompanying notes 1 18-136, supro.
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must choose between group religious rights on the one hand and individual civil rights on the
other.
One of the most compelling arguments on behalf of group autonomy
rights is the overall importance of mediating structures in society. Scholars correctly have pointed
out that mediating structures provide meaning to their adherents as well as a check on the power
of the state. "' Such groups are in effect a buffer between the modern nation-state and the
individual. 42 Aside from the family, the largest and most significant mediating structures in
American society are religious institutions. Invading the integrity of these institutions by regulating
their employment policies compromises and limits their role as checks on government power.
Philosophical consistency is another strong policy argument in favor of
exempting churches entirely from anti-discrimination laws. If pervasively sectarian institutions are
disqualified from receiving government funding, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has held, 43
they likewise should be exempt from government regulation. In short, if even the "secular"
activities of pervasively sectarian institutions are so inundated with religion that they cannot be
funded, it follows that all staff, including lay employees, are substantially involved in the
organization's religious mission and, therefore, exempt from anti-discrimination laws by virtue of
the First Amendment.
Exempting churches in their entirety also is consistent with the Supreme
Court's disinclination toward a case-by-case analysis of pervasively sectarian institutions in other
contexts. Despite numerous pleas to the contrary, the Court has been unwilling to examine or
analyze a particular teacher, class or activity within a parochial school to determine whether it is
nonsectarian. Instead, the Court has decided that religion so permeates the institution it is
impossible to isolate and fund purely secular activities.I'A
Closely related is the notion of workability or, perhaps in this case,
impossibility. How does a court determine which employees of a pervasively sectarian institution
actually perform secular as opposed to religious functions? Suppose, for example, the church
secretary is expected to meet the general public and to answer questions about the nature of the
church and its ministry to the community. Suppose further that the secretary is instructed to
"share his faith" with those who visit the church. Such an employee hardly could be
141 See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 4. See also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d
ed. 1988), at 1297.
142 1d.
143Eq., Bowen v. Kendrick, __ U.S. _ 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988).
144Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Low Judges
characterized as performing a purely secular function. Similarly, the church librarian, child care
director or even maintenance engineer might be contributing to the organization's religioes, as
opposed to secular, purpose. Any attempt by the courts to divide the functions of church
employees into their religious and secular components is fraught with practical as well as
constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has found such a case-by-case evaluation of pervasively
sectarian institutions to be unworkable in the context of aid to parochial schools, and a persuasive
argument can be made that the same principle should apply to the employment policies of
pervasively sectarian institutions.
Equally attractive policy arguments can be made that churches should not
be exempt from anti-discrimination laws with regard to their non-ministerial employees.
First, society's overall sense of justice is offended by any act of invidious
discrimination even if committed by the church. In fact, the social justice argument may be
stronger when the perpetrator of the wrong is an institution that purports to serve as a moral and
ethical guidepost for the community. The Constitution may require courts to tolerate discrimination
when the employment of ministers is at issue, but courts are less likely to countenance such
practices at the support staff level.
In addition to the general lack of sympathy for churches that practice
discrimination, a court's concern for protecting the free exercise of religion is diluted the farther
one moves from the purely religious functions of the church. For example, some judges simply
could not be convinced that a custodian is engaged in anything other than a purely secular
function. To a lesser degree, courts also might be resistant to characterizing the church secretary's
job as ministerial in nature. In short, any act of discrimination is frowned upon, and the courts
are likely to enforce a statute prohibiting such conduct if at all possible.
V. ADVISING CUENTS
Advising clients about the extent to which anti-discrimination laws apply
to religious institutions can be exceedingly difficult. With a proper analytical framework, however,
clients can understand where the legal uncertainties lie and may adjust their employment policies
accordingly. A religious institution may choose to ignore the advice of counsel and base its
employment decisions solely upon what it perceives to be the will of God. Notwithstanding, the
institution should have accurate information about the potential costs, financial and otherwise,
before it makes its decision.
At the outset, counsel should distinguish between laws that express
affirmative legislative intent-"clearly expressed"-to regulate religious institutions and those that do
not. Because Catholic Bishop has not been overturned or even modified, it is unlikely that the
latter category of statutes would be interpreted as applying to churches or other pervasively
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sectarian institutions. '4 The ascension of more conservative justices to the United States
Supreme Court makes it even less likely that Catholic Bishop will be overruled. Counsel should
not assume, however, that Catholic Bishop will be interpreted to shield religiously affiliated
colleges, hospitals and other non-pervasively sectarian institutions from these statutes. To the
contrary, courts probably will treat these institutions like their secular counterparts.
For those laws, such as Title VII, that do express a clear legislative intent
to regulate religious institutions, counsel should use the four categories set forth in Part II-C in
rendering legal advice. Categories 1-3 tend toward relatively clear answers and should pose little
difficulty for counsel. Generally, any religious institutions-pervasively sectarian or othervise-may
exercise unfettered discretion in the employment of its ministerial staff. Discrimination on any
basis (e.g., age, race or sex), therefore, would seem to be permissible. An equally clear message
can be given to religiously affiliated institutions with regard to the employment of their non-
ministerial staff: discrimination other than on the basis of religious beliefs and practices will not
be permitted by the courts.
The final category (i.e., non-ministerial employees in pervasively sectarian
institutions) is, as noted, not amenable to easy answers. To the contrary, courts, scholars and
practitioners alike are divided over whether the religious group or the individual claimant should
prevail. The difficulties associated with a case-by-case analysis of the functions of a particular
church employee to determine whether his duties are primarily "religious" (and, therefore,
exempt) or "secular" (and, therefore, covered) and the Supreme Court's obvious commitment to
eschew such an approach in cases involving aid to parochial schools support the notion that the
Supreme Court would find a church to be wholly beyond the jurisdiction of anti-discrimination laws.
On the other hand, more activist decisions by lower courts suggest a different result." '  Even
if one could convince the Supreme Court that churches should be exempted entirely from coverage,
vindication of a constitutional right is an expensive and time-consuming process. Given the remote
chance of a particular case reaching the Supreme Court, the counsel of prudence would seem to
suggest strict adherence to principles of non-discrimination in the employment of non-ministerial
staff. By advising non-discrimination in these positions, the author does not suggest that churches
cease to enforce their religious doctrines and practices among their non-ministerial staffs. To the
145Assuming orguendo that a court would interpret these statutes as applying to
pervasively sectarian institutions, the extent of coverage fi.e., degree of regulation) would be
the same as that of Title VII and other statutes expressing a clear legislative intent to regulate
religious institutions.
146See text accompanying notes I 1 8-125, supra.
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contrary, all religious organizations are free to discriminate against those who do not share the
religious beliefs as well as the moral and ethical standards of the organization.' 4"
The term "non-ministerial staff" should not be confused with "support
staff" or even "lay employees." An employee may be both support staff as well as non-ordained
and nonetheless function primarily as a minister. Similarly, ordination alone will not place an
individual beyond the jurisdiction of anti-discrimination laws if his primary functions are non-
ministerial.
The author suggests three criteria to assist religious institutions in
determining whether a particular employee's function should be considered ministerial."' First,
does the employee perform any sacerdotal functions such as baptisms, communion, weddings or
funerals? Performance of these "priestly" functions on even an occasional basis will almost
guarantee that an employee's job is ministerial. Second, does the employee perform other
functions, such as preaching, worship leadership, evangelism or visiting the sick, that traditionally
are associated with ministers? Even if the employee does not perform sacerdotal functions, most
judges ore likely to view one who performs these additional functions as being a minister. This
is particularly true in Protestant churches where each member of the congregation is considered
a priest,14 and the distinction between laity and clergy is minimal. Finally, is the employee
ordained, licensed or commissioned by the church? While ordination is by no means dispositive,
as noted above, it is nonetheless a factor judges may take into account when determining whether
a particular employee's functions are ministerial.
Conclusion
The application of anti-discrimination laws to religious institutions will
continue to spawn some of the most interesting and controversial cases in constitutional law. Civil
rights activists likely will argue for more regulation of religious institutions while advocates of
religious liberty will argue for less. Balancing the competing interests of church autonomy versus
equal opportunity will prove a difficult assignment for even the most astute judges as fundamental
social values are at stake.
14tBishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Litle v. Weurl, _ F.2d _ (3d Cir.
1991)
146These criteria originally were suggested to the author by veteran church practitioner
James P Guenther (GUENTHER & JORDAN, Nashville, Tennessee) whose clients include the
Southern Baptist Convention, several theological seminaries and numerous religiously offilialed
colleges and universities.
149 The doctrine of the "priesthood of every believer" is set forth in W. Shurden, The
Priesthood of All Believers ( 1988); L. McBelh, The Baptist Heritage (1987); and R. Bointon,
The Travail of Religious Liberty (1958).
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The four categories suggested by the author provide an analytical
framework for thinking clearly about these policy choices. Applied with the three criteria set forth
in Section V for determining ministerial functions, they should enable religious organizations to
predict with reasonable certainty whether particular positions will be subject to anti-discrimination
laws.
While the Supreme Court eventually may vindicate the church's
constitutional claim to exemption from anti-discrimination laws, its denial of certiorari in cases such
as Southwestern Seminary indicates a reluctance on its part to do so. Moreover, when it has
been faced directly with the issue, as in Catholic Bishop and Dayton Christian Schools, the Court
has invoked various doctrines to avoid deciding the ultimate question. Prudence suggests,
therefore, that until and unless the Court alters its course, pervasively sectarian institutions adjust
their employment policies accordingly.
